Bayesian reasoning versus conventional statistics in High Energy Physics by D'Agostini, G.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/9
81
10
46
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.da
ta-
an
]  
24
 N
ov
 19
98 BAYESIAN REASONING VERSUS CONVENTIONAL STATISTICSIN HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS
G. D’AGOSTINI
Dipartimento di Fisica dell’Universita` “La Sapienza”
Piazzale Aldo Moro 2, I-00185 Roma (Italy)†
Abstract. The intuitive reasoning of physicists in conditions of uncertainty is
closer to the Bayesian approach than to the frequentist ideas taught at University
and which are considered the reference framework for handling statistical prob-
lems. The combination of intuition and conventional statistics allows practitioners
to get results which are very close, both in meaning and in numerical value, to those
obtainable by Bayesian methods, at least in simple routine applications. There are,
however, cases in which “arbitrary” probability inversions produce unacceptable
or misleading results and in these cases the conscious application of Bayesian rea-
soning becomes crucial. Starting from these considerations, I will finally comment
on the often debated question: “is there any chance that all physicists will become
Bayesian?”
Key words: Subjective Bayesian Theory, High Energy Physics, Measurement
Uncertainty
1. Introduction
High Energy Physics (HEP) is well known for using very sophisticated detectors,
status of the art computers, ultra-fast data acquisition systems, and very detailed
(Monte Carlo) simulations. One might imagine that a similar level of refinement
could be found in its analysis tools, on the trail of the progress in probability the-
ory and statistics of the past half century. Quite the contrary! As pointed out by
the downhearted Zech[1], “some decades ago physicists were usually well educated
in basic statistics in contrast to their colleagues in social and medical sciences.
Today the situation is almost reversed. Very sophisticated methods are used in
these disciplines, whereas in particle physics standard analysis tools available in
many program packages seem to make knowledge of statistics obsolete. This leads
to strange habits, like the determination of a r.m.s. of a sample through a fit to
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a Gaussian. More severe are a widely spread ignorance about the (lack of) signifi-
cance of χ2 tests with a large number of bins and missing experience with unfolding
methods”. In my opinion, the main reason for this cultural gap is that statistics
and probability are not given sufficient importance in the student curricula: ad
hoc formulae are provided in laboratory courses to report the “errors” of measure-
ments; the few regular lectures on “statistics” usually mix up descriptive statistics,
probability theory and inferential statistics. This leaves a lot of freedom for per-
sonal interpretations of the subject (nothing to do with subjective probability!).
Of equal significance is the fact that the disturbing catalog of inconsistencies[2] of
“conventional”1 statistics helps to give the impression that this subject is matter
of initiates and local gurus, rather than a scientific discipline2. The result is that
standard knowledge of statistics at the end of the University curriculum is insuf-
ficient and confused, as widely recognized. Typical effects of this (dis-)education
are the “Gaussian syndrome”3 (from which follows the uncritical use of the rule
of combining results, weighing them with inverse of the “error” squared4, or the
habit of calling χ2 any sum of squared differences between fitted curves and data
points, and to use it as if it were a χ2), the abused “
√
n rule” to evaluate “errors”
of counting experiments5 and the reluctance to take into account correlations6,
just to remain at a very basic level.
I don’t think that researchers in medical science or in biology have a better
statistics education than physicists. On the contrary, their usually scant knowledge
of the subject forces them to collaborate with professional statisticians, and this is
the reason why statistics journals contain plenty of papers in which sophisticated
methods are developed to solve complicated problems in the aforementioned fields.
Physicists, especially in HEP, tend to be more autonomous, because of their skills
in mathematics and computing, plus of a good dose of intuition. But one has to
1I prefer to call the frequentist approach “conventional” rather than “classical”.
2Who can have failed to experience endless discussions about trivial statistical problems, the
solution of which was finally accepted just because of the (scientific or, more often, political)
authority of somebody, rather than because of the strength of the logical arguments?
3I know a senior physicist who used to teach students that standard deviation is meaningful
only for the Gaussian, and that it is “defined” as half of the interval around the average which
contains 68% of the events! More common is the evaluation of the standard deviation of a data
sample fitting a Gaussian to the data histogram (see also the previous quotation of Zech[1]), even
in those cases in which the histogram has nothing to do with a Gaussian. The most absurd case
I have heard of is that of someone fitting a Gaussian to a histogram exhibiting a flat shape (and
having good reasons for being considered to come from coming from a uniform distribution) to
find the resolution of a silicon strip detector!.
4For instance, the 1998 issue of the Review of Particle Physics[3] includes an example based
on this kind of mistake with the intention to show that “the Bayesian methodology . . . is not
appropriate for the objective presentation of experimental data” (section 29.6.2, pag. 175).
5Who has never come across somebody calculating the “error” on the efficiency ǫ = n/N ,
using the standard “error propagation” starting from
√
n and
√
N?
6In the past, the correlation matrix was for many HEP physicists “that mysterious list of
numbers printed out by MINUIT” (MINUIT[4] is the minimization/fitting package mostly used
in HEP), but at least some cared about understanding what those numbers meant and how
to use them in further analysis. Currently - I agree with Zech[1] - the situation has worsened:
although many people do take into account correlations, especially in combined analysis of crucial
Standard Model parameters, the interactive packages, which display only standard deviations of
fitted parameters, tend to “hide” the existence of correlations to average users.
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admit that it is rather unlikely that a physicist, in a constant hurry to publish
results before anybody else, can reinvent methods which have been reached by
others after years of work and discussion. Even those physicists who are considered
experts in statistics usually read books and papers written and refereed by other
physicists. The HEP community remains, therefore, isolated with respect to the
mainstream of research in probability and statistics.
In this paper I will not try to review all possible methods used in HEP, nor
to make a detailed comparison between conventional and Bayesian solutions to
solve the same problems. Those interested in this kind of statistical and historical
study are recommended to look at the HEP databases and electronic archives[5]. I
think that the participants in this workshop are more interested in learning about
the attitude of HEP physicists towards the fundamental aspects of probability, in
which framework they make uncertainty statements, how subjective probability
is perceived, and so on. The intention here will be, finally, to contribute to the
debate around the question “Why isn’t everybody a Bayesian”[2], recently turned
into “Why isn’t every physicist a Bayesian”[6]. The theses which I will try to defend
are:
− there is a contradiction between a cultural background in statistics and the
good sense of physicists, and physicists’ intuition is closer to the Bayesian
approach than one might na¨ıvely think;
− there are cases in which good sense alone is not enough and serious mistakes
can be made; it is then that the philosophical and practical advantages offered
by the Bayesian approach become of crucial importance;
− there is a chance that the Bayesian approach can become widely accepted, if
it is presented in a way which is close to physicists intuitions and can solve
the “existential” problem of reconciling two aspects which seem irreconcilable:
subjective probability and the honest ideal of objectivity which scientists have.
Some of the points sketched quickly in this paper are discussed in detail in
lecture notes[7] based on several seminars and minicourses given over the past
years. These notes also contain plenty of general and HEP inspired applications.
2. Measurement Uncertainty
An idea well rooted among physicists, especially nuclear and particle physicists,
is that the result of a measurement must be reported with a corresponding uncer-
tainty. What makes the measured values subject to a degree of uncertainty is, it
is commonly said, the effect of unavoidable measurement errors, usually classified
as random (or statistical) and systematic7.
7This last statement may sound like a tautology, since “error” and “uncertainty” are often used
as synonyms. This hints to the fact that in this subject there is neither uniformity of language,
nor of methods, as is recognized by the metrological organizations, which have made great efforts
to bring some order into the field[8–12]. In particular, the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) has published “Guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement”[10],
containing definitions, recommendations and practical examples. For example, error is defined
as “the result of a measurement minus a true value of the measurand” uncertainty “a parameter,
associated with the result of a measurement, that characterize the dispersion of the values that
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Uncertainties due to statistical errors are commonly treated using the frequen-
tist concept of confidence intervals, although the procedure is so unnatural that
the interpretation of the result is unconsciously subjective (as will be shown in a
while), and there are known cases (of great relevance in frontier research) in which
this approach is not applicable.
As far as uncertainties due to systematics errors are concerned, there is no
conventional consistent theory to handle them, as is also indirectly recognized by
the ISO Guide[10]. The “fashion” at the moment is to add them quadratically
if they are considered to be independent, or to build a covariance matrix if not.
This procedure is not justified theoretically (in the frequentist approach) and I
think that it is used essentially because of the reluctance of experimentalists to
add linearly the dozens of contributions of a complicated HEP measurement, as
the old fashioned “theory” of maximum errors suggests doing8. The pragmatic
justification for the quadratic combination of “systematic errors” is that one is
using a rule (the famous “error propagation” formula9) which is considered to be
valid at least for “statistical errors”. But, in reality, this too is not correct. The use
of this formula is again arbitrary in the case of “statistical errors”, if these have
been evaluated from confidence intervals10. In fact, there is no logical reason why
a probabilistic procedure proved for standard deviations of random variables (the
could reasonably be attributed to measurand”, and, finally, true value “a value compatible with
the definition of the given particular quantity”. One can easily see that it is not just a question
of practical definitions. It seems to me that there is a well-thought-out philosophical choice be-
hind these definitions, although it is not discussed extensively in the Guide. Two issues in the
Guide that I find of particular importance are the discussion on the sources of uncertainty and
the admission that all contributions to the uncertainty are of a probabilistic nature. The latter
is strictly related to the subjective interpretation of probability, as admitted by the Guide and
discussed in depth in [7]. (The reason why these comments on the ISO Guide have been placed
in this long footnote is that, unfortunately, the Guide is not yet known in the HEP community
and, therefore, has no influence on the behaviour of HEP physicists about which I am going to
comment here. This is also the reason why I will often use in this paper typical expressions cur-
rently used in HEP and which are in disagreement with the ISO recommendations. But I will use
these expressions preferably within quote marks, like “systematic error” instead of “uncertainty
due to a recognized systematic error of unknown size”.)
8In fact, one can see that when there are only 2 or 3 contributions to the “systematic error”,
there are still people who prefer to add them linearly.
9The most well-known version is that in which correlations are neglected:
σ2(Y ) =
∑
i
(
∂Y
∂Xi
)2
σ2(Xi) .
Y stands for the quantity of interest, the value of which depends on directly measured quantities,
calibration constants and other systematic effects (all terms generically indicated by Xi). This
formula comes from probability theory, but it is valid if Xi and Y are random variables, σ(Xi) are
standard deviation and the linearization is reasonable. It is very interesting to look at text books
to see how this formula is derived. The formula is usually initially proofed referring to random
variables associated to observables and then, suddenly, it is referred to physics quantities, without
any justification.
10As far as “systematic errors” are concerned the situation is much more problematic because
the “errors” are not even operationally well defined: they may correspond to subjectivist standard
deviations (what I consider to be correct, and what corresponds to the ISO type B standard
uncertainty[10]), but they can more easily be maximum deviations, ±50% variation on a selection
cut, or the absolute difference obtained using two assumptions for the systematic effect.
BAYESIAN REASONING VS CONVENTIONAL STATISTICS IN HEP 5
observables) should also be valid for 68% confidence intervals, which is considered,
somehow, an uncertainty attributed to the true value.
These examples show quite well the contradiction between the cultural back-
ground on probability and the practical good sense of physicists. Thanks to this
good sense, frequentist ideas are constantly violated, with the positive effect that
at least some results are obtained11. It is interesting to notice that in simple routine
applications these results are very close, both in value and in meaning, to those
achievable starting from what I consider to be the correct point of view for han-
dling uncertainty (subjective probability). There are, on the other hand, critical
cases in which scientific conclusions may be seriously mistaken. Before discussing
these cases, let us look more closely at the terms of the claimed contradiction.
3. Professed Frequentism versus Practiced Subjectivism
3.1. HEP PHYSICISTS “ARE FREQUENTIST”
If one asks HEP physicists “what is probability?”, one will realize immediately
that they “think they are” frequentist. The same impression is got looking at the
books and lecture notes they use[13]. Particularly significant, to get an overview
of ideas and methods commonly used, are the PDG[3] and other booklets[14,15]
which have a kind of explicit (e.g. [3,14]) or implicit (e.g. [15]) imprimatur of HEP
organizations.
If, instead, one asks physicists what they think about probability as “degree of
belief” the reaction is negative and can even be violent: “science must be objective:
there is no room for belief”, or “I don’t believe something. I assess it. This is no
a matter for religion!”.
3.2. HEP PHYSICISTS “ARE BAYESIAN”
On the other hand, if one requires physicists to express their opinion about prac-
tical situations in condition of uncertainty, instead of just standard examination
questions, one gets a completely different impression. One realize vividly that Sci-
ence is indeed based on beliefs, very solid and well grounded beliefs, but they
remain beliefs “. . . in instrument types, in programs of experiment enquiry, in the
trained, individual judgements about every local behavior of pieces of appara-
tus”[16].
Physicists find it absolutely natural to talk about the probability of hypothe-
ses, a concept for which there is no room in the frequentist approach. Also the
intuitive way with which they figure out the result is, in fact, a probabilistic as-
sessment on the true value. Try to ask what is the probability that the top quark
mass is between 170 and 180 GeV. No one12 will reply that the question has no
sense, since “the top quark mass is a constant of unknown value” (as an orthodox
11I am strongly convinced that a rigorous application of frequentist ideas leads nowhere.
12Certainly one may find people aware of the “sophistication” of the frequentist approach, but
these kinds of probabilistic statements are currently heard in conferences and no frequentist guru
stands up to complain that the speaker is talking nonsense.
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frequentist should complain). They will simply answer that the probability is such
and such percent, using the published value and “error”. They are usually sur-
prised if somebody tries to explain to them that they “are not allowed” to speak
of probability of a true value.
Another word which physicists find scandalous is “prior” (“I don’t want to
be influenced by prejudices” is the usual reply). But in reality priors play a very
important role in laboratory routines, as well as at the moment of deciding that
a paper is ready for publication. They allow experienced physicists to realize that
something is going wrong, that a student has most probably made a serious mis-
take, that the result has not yet been corrected by all systematic effects, and so
on. Unavoidably, priors generate some subtle cross correlations among results, and
there are well known cases of the values of physics quantities slowly drifting from
an initial point, with all subsequent results being included in the “error bar” of
the previous experiment. But I think that there no one and nothing is to blame
for the fact that these things happen (unless made on purpose): a strong evidence
is needed before the scientific community radically changes its mind, and such
evidence is often achieved after a long series of experiments. Moreover, very subtle
systematic effects may affect the data, and it is not a simple task for an experi-
mentalist to decide when all corrections have been applied, if he has no idea what
the result should be.
3.3. INTUITIVE APPLICATION OF BAYES’ THEOREM
There is an example which I like to give, in order to demonstrate that the intuitive
reasoning which unconsciously transforms confidence intervals into probability in-
tervals for the true value is, in fact, very close to the Bayes’ theorem. Let us imagine
we see a hunting dog in a forest and have to guess where the hunter is, knowing
that there is a 50% probability that the dog is within 100 m around him. The
terms of the analogy with respect to observable and true value are obvious. Ev-
erybody will answer immediately that, with 50% probability, the hunter is within
100 m from the dog. But everybody will also agree that the solution relies on
some implicit assumptions: uniform prior distribution (of the hunter in the forest)
and symmetric likelihood (the dog has no preferred direction, as far as we know,
when he runs away from the hunter). Any variation in the assumptions leads to a
different solution. And this is also easily recognized by physicists, expecially HEP
physicists, who are aware of situations in which the prior is not flat (like the cases
of a bremsstrahlung photon or of a cosmic ray spectrum) or the likelihood is not
symmetric (not all detectors have a nice Gaussian response). In these situations
intuition may still help a qualitatively guess to be made about the direction of
the effect on the value of the measurand, but a formal application of the Bayesian
ideas becomes crucial in order to state a result which is consistent with what can
be honestly learned from data.
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3.4. BAYES VERSUS MONTE CARLO
The fact that Bayesian inference is not currently used in HEP does not imply that
non-trivial inverse problems remain unsolved, or that results are usually wrong.
The solution often relies on extensive use of Monte Carlo (MC) simulation13 and
on intuition. The inverse problem is then treated as a direct one. The quantities
of interest are considered as MC parameters, and are varied until the best statis-
tical agreement between simulation output and experimental data is achieved. In
principle, this is a simple numerical implementation of Maximum Likelihood, but
in reality the prior distribution is also taken into account in the simulation when
it is known to be non uniform (like in the aforementioned example of a cosmic ray
experiment). So, in reality what it is often maximized is not the likelihood, but
the Bayesian posterior (likelihood×prior), and, as said before, the result is intu-
itively considered to be a probabilistic statement for the true value. So, also in this
case, the results are close to those obtainable by Bayesian inference, especially if
the posterior is almost Gaussian (parabolic negative log-likelihood). Problems may
occur, instead, when the “not used” prior is most likely not uniform, or when
the posterior is very non-Gaussian. In the latter case the difference between mode
and average of the distribution, and the evaluation of the uncertainty from the
“∆(log-likelihood) = 1/2 rule” can make quite a difference to the result.
4. Explicit use of Bayesian methods in HEP
Besides the intuitive use of Bayesian reasoning, there are, in fact, some applications
in which the Bayes’ theorem is explicitly applied. This happens when frequentist
methods “do not work”, i.e. they give manifestly absurd results, or in solving more
complicated problems than just inferring the value of a quantity, like, for example,
the deconvolution of a spectrum (“unfolding”). Nevertheless, these methods are
mostly used with a utilitarian spirit, without having really understood the meaning
of subjective probability, or even remaining skeptical about it. They are used as
one uses one of the many frequentist “ad hoc-eries”14, after it has been “proved”
that they work by MC simulation15.
Some of the cases in which the conventional methods do not work have even
induced the PDG[3] to present Bayesian methods. But, according to the PDG,
13If there is something in which HEP physicists really believe, it is Monte Carlo simulation! It
plays a crucial role in all analyses, but sometimes its use as a multipurpose brute force problem
solver is really unjustified and it can, from a cultural point of view, be counterproductive. For
example, I have seen it applied to solve elementary problems which could be solved analytically,
like “proving” that the variance of the sum of two random numbers is the sum of the variances.
I once found a sentence at the end of the solution of a standard probability problem which I
consider to be symptomatic of this brute force behaviour: “if you don’t trust logic, then you can
make a little Monte Carlo. . . ”.
14For example, this was exactly the attitude which I had some years ago, when I wrote a
Bayesian unfolding program[17], and that of the large majority my colleagues who still use the
program. Now, after having attended the 1998 Valencia Meeting on Bayesian Statistics, I have
realized that this pragmatic frequentist-like use of Bayesian methods is rather common.
15I would like to point out that sometimes the conclusions derived from MC checks of Bayesian
procedures may be misleading, as discussed in detail in [7].
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a paper published this year[18] finally gives a frequentist solution to the prob-
lems, and this solution is recommended for publishing the results. Let us review
the situation citing directly [18]: “Classical confidence intervals are the traditional
way in which high energy physicists report errors on results of experiments. . . . In
recent years, there has been considerable dissatisfaction . . . for upper confidence
limits. . . This dissatisfaction led the PDG to describe procedures for Bayesian in-
terval construction in the troublesome cases: Poisson processes with background
and Gaussian errors with a bounded physical region. . . . In this paper, we . . . use
(. . . ) to obtain a unified set of classical confidence intervals for setting upper limits
and quoting two-sided confidence intervals. . . .We then obtain confidence intervals
which are never unphysical or empty. Thus they remove an original motivation for
the description of Bayesian intervals by the PDG.” In fact, the 1998 issue of the
Review of Particle Physics still exhibits the Bayesian approach (with the typical
misconceptions that frequentists have about it), but then it suggests two papers
by frequentists[6,2] (“a balanced discussion”[3]) to help practitioners to form their
own idea on the subject, and, finally, it warmly recommends the new frequentist
approach. It is easy to imagine what the reaction of the average HEP physicist will
be when confronted by the authority of the PDG, unaware that “the PDG” which
rules analysis methods is in reality constituted of no more than one or two persons
who recommend a paper written by their friends (as is clear from the references
and the cross acknowledgements). One should also notice that this paper claims
important progress in statistics, but was in fact published in a physics journal (I
wonder what the reaction of a referee of a statistics journal would have been. . . ).
In conclusion, there is still a large gap between good sense and the dominating
statistical culture. For this reason we must still be very careful in interpreting
published results and in evaluating whether or not the conventional methods used
lead to correct scientific conclusions “by chance”. Some cases of misleading results
will be described in the next section.
5. Examples of Misleading Results Induced by Conventional Statistics
It is well known that the frequentist denial of the concept of probability of hy-
potheses leads to misleading results in all cases in which the simple “dog-hunter
inversion paradigm” is violated. This also happens in HEP.
As already discussed, confidence levels are intuitively thought (and usually
taught) as probabilities for the true values. I must recognize that many frequentist
books do insist on the fact that the probability statement is not referred to the
true value. But then, when these books have to explain the “real meaning” of
the result, they are forced to use ambiguous sentences which remain stamped in
the memory of the reader much more than the frequentistically-correct twisted
reasoning that they try to explain. For example Frodesen et al.[13] speak about
“the faith we attach to this statement”, as if “faith” was not the same as degree
of belief. . . ); Eadie et al.[13] introduce the argument saying that “we want to find
the range . . . which contains the true value θ◦ with probability β”
16; and so on.
16I think that Aristoteles would have gotten mad if somebody had tried to convince him that
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Similarly, significance levels are usually taken as probability of the tested hy-
pothesis. Also this non-orthodox interpretation is stimulated by sentences like “in
statistical context, the words highly significant mean proved beyond a reasonable
doubt”. It is also well known that the arbitrary translation of p-values into proba-
bility of the null hypothesis produces more severe mistakes than those concerning
the use of confidence interval for uncertainty statements on true values.
Let us consider some real life examples of the misinterpretation of the two kinds
just described.
5.1. CLAIMS OF NEW PHYSICS BASED ON P -VALUES
You may have heard in past years some rumors, or even official claims, of dis-
coveries of “New Physics”, i.e. of phenomenology which goes behind the so called
Standard Model of elementary particles. Then, after some time, these announce-
ments were systematically recognized as having been false alarms, with a conse-
quent reduction in the credibility of the HEP community in the eyes of public
opinion and tax payers (with easily imaginable long term aftermath for govern-
ment support of this research). All these fake discoveries were based on considering
low p-values as probability of the null hypothesis “no new effect”. The most re-
cent example of this kind is the so called 1997 “HERA high Q2 events excess”.
The H1 and ZEUS collaborations, analyzing data collected at the HERA very
high energy electron-proton collider in Hamburg (Germany), found an excess of
events (with respect to expectations) in the kinematical region corresponding to
very hard interactions[19]. The “combined significance”17 of the excess was of the
order of 1%. Its interpretation as a hint of new physics was even suggested by
official statement by the laboratory and by other agencies. For example the DESY
official statement was “. . . the joint distribution has a probability of less than one
percent to come from Standard Model NC DIS processes”[22] (then it implies “it
has a > 99% probability of not coming from the standard model!”18). Similarly,
the Italian INFN reported that “la probabilita` che gli eventi osservati siano una
the proposition “the range contains θ◦ with probability β” does not imply “θ◦ is in that range
with probability β”.
17Physicists are not familiar with the term p-value (readers not familiar with this term may
find a concise review in [20]). Moreover, they are usually not aware of the implications of the
fact that the statistical significance takes into account also the probability of unobserved data
(see, e.g., [21]).
18One might think that the misleading meaning of that sentence was due to unfortunate
wording, but this possibility is ruled out by other statements which show clearly a quite odd
point of view of probabilistic matter. In fact the DESY 1998 activity report[23] insists in saying
that “the likelihood that the data produced is the result of a statistical fluctuation, . . . , is
equivalent to that of tossing a coin and throwing seven ’heads’ or ’tails’ in a row” (replacing
’probability’ by ’likelihood’ does not change the sense of the message). Then, trying to explain
the meaning of a statistical fluctuation, the following example is given: “This process can be
simulated with a die. If the number of times a die is thrown is sufficiently large, the die falls
equally often on all faces, i.e. all six numbers occur equally often. The probability for each face
is exactly a sixth or 16.66% - assuming the die is not loaded. If the die is thrown less often, then
the probability curve for the distribution of the six die values is no longer a straight line but has
peaks and troughs. The probability distribution obtained by throwing the die varies about the
theoretical value of 16.66% depending on how many times it is thrown”.
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fluttazione statistica e` inferiore all’1 %” (then, it implies that “with 99% proba-
bility, the events are not a statistical fluctuation, i.e. new physics”!). This is the
reason why the press reported the news as “scientists are practically sure they
have found new physics”. What I found astonishing is that most of the people
I talked to had real difficulty in understanding that this probability inversion is
not legitimate. Only when I forced them to state their degree of belief using the
logic of the coherent bet did it emerge that most of my colleagues would not even
place a 1:1 bet in favour of the new discovery. Nevertheless, they were in favour
of publishing the result because the loss function was absolutely unbalanced (an
indirect Nobel prize against essentially nothing).
5.2. WHAT DOES A LOWER MASS BOUND MEAN?
The second example concerns confidence intervals, and it comes from new particle
search. This has always been one of the main activities of HEP. New particles are
postulated by theories and experimentalists look for evidence for them in experi-
mental data. Usually, if the particle is not “observed”19 one says that, although the
observation does not disprove the existence of the particle, this is an indication of
the fact that the particle is “too heavy”. The result is then quantified by a “lower
bound” at a “95% confidence level”. Without entering into detail of how the limit
is operationally defined (see, e.g., [24] and references therein, in particular [25],
to have an idea of the level of complication reachable to solve a simple problem),
I want to point out that also in this case the result can be misleading. Again I
will give a real life example. A combined analysis of all the LEP experiments on
the Higgs mass concluded recently that “A 95% confidence level lower bound of
77.5 GeV/c2 is obtained for the mass of the Standard Model Higgs boson”20. This
sounds as if one were sure at 95% that the mass is above the quoted bound. In
fact, most of the people I interviewed about the meaning of the statement, even
those belonging to the LEP experimental teams, answered “if the Higgs boson
exists at all, then there is 95% probability that its mass is above the limit”. There
were also a few people who answered “if I do a MC simulation of the decay of a
77.5 GeV Higgs boson, I get in only 5% of the cases the simulation describing the
data”, or “if there is an Higgs boson and its mass is less than 77.5 GeV, then the
observations of the search experiments have a probability of at most 5% of being
correct”, or something similar. From all of which it is very difficult to understand,
from a logical point of view, why one should be 95% confident that the mass is
higher than the bound21.
19This concept of “observation” is not like that of seeing a black swan, to mention a famous
classical example. New particles leave signatures in the detector that on an event by event basis
cannot be distinguished by other processes (background). A statistical (inferential) analysis is
therefore needed.
20In the meanwhile new data have increased this limit, but the actual number is irrelevant for
this discussion.
21There was also somebody who refused to answer because “your question is going to be
difficult to answer”, or without any justification (perhaps they realized that it was impossible
to explain the statement to a scientific journalist, or to a government authority - these were
the terms of my question - without using probabilistic statements which were incompatible with
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The problem can be solved easily with Bayesian methods (see [7] for details).
Assuming a flat prior for the mass, one finds that the value of the lower bound is
more or less the published one, but only under the condition that the mass does
not exceed the kinematical limit of the studied reaction. But this limit is just a few
GeV above the stated lower bound. Thus in order to obtain the correct result one
needs to renormalize the probability taking account of the possible range of masses
above the kinematical limit and for which the experiment has no sensitivity. For
this reason, in the case of [24] the probability that the mass value is above 77.5
GeV/c2 may easily become 99.9%, or more, depending on the order of magnitude
of a possible upper bound for the mass. Then, in practice these lower bounds can
be taken as certainties22.
6. Conclusions
Although it is clear that the dominant statistical culture is still frequentism in
HEP (and everywhere else), I am myself rather optimist on the possibility that
the situation will change, at least in HEP, and that Bayesian reasoning will emerge
from an intuitive to a conscious level. This is not a dream (although clearly several
academic generations are still needed) if the theory is presented in a way that it
is acceptable to an “experienced physicist”.
− First, it is not difficult to get a consensus on the observation that subjective
probability is the natural concept developed by the human mind to quantify
the plausibility of events in conditions of uncertainty.
− Second, one should insist on the fact that Bayes’ theorem is in fact a natural
way of reasoning in updating probability, and not a philosophical point of
view that somebody tries to apply to data analysis23 (see [7] for details).
− Bayes’ theorem is not “all”. It only works in situations where the nice scheme
of prior and likelihood is applicable. In many circumstances one can assess a
subjective probability directly (try asking a carpenter how much he believes
the result of his measurement!).
− The coherent bet (a` la de Finetti[27]) forces people to be honest and to make
the best (i.e. “most objective”) assessments of probability.
− It is preferable not to mix up probability evaluation with decision problems24.
what they thought about probability).
22There are in fact theorists who “assume” the lower bounds as certain bounds in their con-
siderations. Perhaps they do it intuitively, or because they have heard in the last decades of
thousands of these 95% lower bounds, and never a particle has then shown up in the 5% side. . .
23For example frequentists completely misunderstand this points, when they state, e.g., that
“Bayesian methods proceed by invoking an interpretation of Bayes’ theorem, in which one deems
it sensible to consider a p.d.f. for the unknown true value mt”, or that “a pragmatist can consider
the utility of equations generated by the two approaches while skirting the issue of buying a whole
philosophy of science”[6].
I find that also the Zellner’s paper[26] demonstrating that Bayes’ theorem makes the best use
of the available information can help a lot to convince people.
24Although it may seem absurd, the Bayesian approach is recognized by “frequentists” to be
“well adapted to decision-making situations”[3](see also [6,18]). I wonder what then probability
is for these authors.
12 G. D’AGOSTINI
In other words, the coherent bet should be considered hypothetical. This
makes a clear distinction between our beliefs and our wishes (the example in
section 5.1 should teach something in this respect).
− One may think, na¨ıvely, that the “objective Bayesian theory” is more suited
for science than the “subjective one”. Instead, it seems to me easier to con-
vince experienced physicists that “there is nothing really that is objective”,
than it is to accept an objective theory containing ingredients which appear
dogmatic25 from the physicist point of view[28,7]. Any experienced physi-
cist knows already that the only “objective” thing in science is the reading
of digital scales. When we want to transform this information into scientific
knowledge we have to make use of many implicit and explicit beliefs (see sec-
tion 3.2). Nevertheless, the “honest” (but na¨ıve) ideal of objectivity can be
recovered if scientific knowledge is considered as a kind of very solid networks
of beliefs, based on centuries of experimentation, with fuzzy borders which
correspond to the areas of present research. My preferred motto is that “no
one should be allowed to talk about objectivity, unless he has 10 or 20 years of
experience in frontier science, economics, or any other real world application”.
In particular, mathematicians should refrain from using the word objectivity
when talking about the physical world.
− It is very important to work on applications: the simplicity and the naturalness
of the Bayesian reasoning will certainly attract people.
− Many conventional methods can be easily recovered as limit cases of the
Bayesian ones, if some well defined restricting conditions are valid, as already
discussed in section 3.4. For example, when I make a χ2 fit I consider myself
to be using a Bayesian method, although in a simplified form. This attitude
contrasts to that of practitioners who use methods in which the Bayes’ theo-
rem is explicitly applied, but as if it were one of the many frequentist cooking
recipes.
− It is important to make efforts to introduce Bayesian thinking in teaching,
starting from the basic courses. I am not the first to have realized that the
Bayesian approach is simple for students. The resistance comes from our col-
leagues, who are unwilling to renew the contents of their lectures, and who
have developed a distorted way of thinking.
Finally, I would like to give a last recommendation. Don’t try to convince a physi-
cist that he already is Bayesian, or that you want to convert him to become
Bayesian. A physicist feels offended if you call him “X-ian”, be it Newtonian, Fer-
mian, or Einsteinian. But, being human, he has a natural feel for probability, just
like everybody else. I would like to generalize this idea and propose reducing the
25Dogmatism is never desirable. It can be easily turned against the theory. For example, one
criticism of [18] says, more or less, that Bayesian theory supports Jeffreys’ priors, and not uni-
form priors, but, since Jeffreys’ priors give unreasonable results in their application, then one
should mistrust Bayesian methods! (see also [28].) One may object that the meaning and the
role of Jeffreys’ priors was misunderstood, but it seems to me difficult to control the use of ob-
jective priors or of reference analysis once they have left the community of experts aware of the
“rather special nature and role of the concept of a ‘minimally informative’ prior specification -
appropriately defined!”[29].
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use of the adjective “Bayesian”. I think that the important thing is to have a
theory of uncertainty in which “probability” has the same meaning for everybody,
precisely that meaning which the human mind has naturally developed and that
frequentists have tried to kill. Therefore I would rather call these methods proba-
bilistic methods. And I conclude saying that, obviously, “I am not a Bayesian”.
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